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When I was a beginning graduate student, I once attended a public lecture by Martha 
Nussbaum on the capabilities approach. At the beginning of the Q&A session, a gentleman – 
probably a professor – raised what he clearly thought was a devastating objection. Nussbaum 
started her reply by saying “There are six reasons why that’s not right”. For the next five to 
ten minutes, she presented those reasons in long and beautiful English sentences, all speaking 
directly to the point. Each was individually convincing; together, they amounted to a decisive 
rebuttal of the challenge. The rest of the session proceeded along the same lines. I, for my 
part, was awestruck. I had never seen anything quite like that. There was no obfuscation, 
misunderstanding, changing the topic, or appeal to authority, just calm, lucid reasoning in 
response to a somewhat hostile charge. I thought that was the way a philosopher or indeed an 
academic in general should conduct herself, and I thought “I hope that one day I’ll be like that 
myself.” I went back to work with new energy. 
 Clearly, my attitude towards Nussbaum was (and is) one of admiration. What I’ll try 
to do in this paper is clarify the nature, function, and appropriateness of the kind of 
admiration we can feel towards agents, rather than nature or inanimate objects. I’ll pay 
particular attention to commonalities and differences between admiration and related attitudes 
like pride, contempt, and shame. I label such attitudes exhortative, since they all in different 
ways serve to guide us towards realizing ideals of the person in our lives by developing or 
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maintaining the right kind of characteristics and shedding problematic ones. Admiration, in 
particular, fixes on a perceived exemplar of an ideal we endorse, focusing on the whole 
person rather than a particular act. Given its person-focus, I argue, it is not always all-things-
considered appropriate even when it’s fitting in the sense that the person is in some way 
admirable – though at the same time, it is not inherently ethically problematic, unlike pride 
that focuses on oneself as a person rather than as the author of particular acts.  
 
1. Attitudes and Ideals of the Person 
My discussion does not presuppose any particular theory of emotion or attitudes, but I do 
assume that they have two important features: they are both intentional and motivational. 
More precisely, they have a double intentionality: they have an intentional object or target, 
such as a person, and they construe that target as being in a particular way, for example 
dangerous. The feature that the target is construed as having is often called the emotion’s 
formal object. Equally importantly, emotions inherently motivate us to act in a way that 
makes sense in light of the construal – for example, anger, which construes someone as 
violating or having violated a norm we endorse, motivates us to act in a way that makes it 
more likely for them to conform to the norm in the future, other things being equal. Finally, 
the intentionality of attitudes yields conditions for their fittingness or warrant or correctness. 
I’ll say that an attitude is fitting if the target really has the evaluative features it is construed to 
have. I think that this amounts to the same as saying that the target’s features are reasons to 
act as the attitude motivates, but my arguments here won’t rely on this assumption.  
We have many different evaluative attitudes that can be classified in different ways. 
One fundamental division is based on the different social functions of the attitudes. Consider, 
first, that some possible choices make living together impossible, difficult, or a nuisance, 
while other possible choices spread joy and wealth. To discourage the former and encourage 
 3 
the latter, in other words to regulate what people do, we endorse and enforce norms for 
actions. It is such normative expectations that are manifest in act-focused responses like guilt, 
anger, and indignation. We also have attitudes like gratitude that respond to meeting or 
exceeding such expectations. 
But besides particular actions, we also know that there are some people whose 
choices form a pattern across different situations that results in their thriving and the thriving 
of others around them, promoting or realizing important values, while others consistently 
cause misery, ugliness, and disappointment. The former may serve as exemplars, giving 
content to ideals of the person that we have, and the latter fall dramatically short of them. 
While normative expectations concern doing specific kinds of things, ideals of the person 
concern being and living in a certain way. We may have such ideals in the abstract – we might 
want to be fair and brave, say – but given our cognitive and imaginative limitations, coming 
to understand how to actually realize them in our lives typically requires attending to those 
who appear to have already succeeded. The role of what I’ll call exhortative attitudes (for 
want of a better term) is thus to give direction to personal growth and change. They do so by 
motivating us to push ourselves or others in the direction of developing or maintaining the 
right kind of characteristics, and getting rid of the wrong kind of ones. 
Here’s a table of the key exhortative attitudes that shows how they relate to ideals of 
the person: 
 First-personal Third-personal 
Conspicuously close to ideal Pride Admiration 
Conspicuously far from ideal Shame Contempt 
 
Roughly, pride is the first-personal response to living in accordance with or approaching an 
ideal we endorse (Fischer 2012) and shame to falling short (Tangney and Dearing 2002), 
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while admiration is a third-personal response to another’s living in accordance with an ideal 
(Shoemaker 2015) to a higher degree than the norm or oneself, and contempt to falling short 
(Mason 2003). Note that in saying that these attitudes are responses to living in accordance 
with approaching or falling short of an ideal I don’t mean to suggest that we first have some 
articulated conception of an ideal of the person in mind and then judge that someone 
approaches or falls short of it. More plausibly, our ideals are manifest in our reactions: it is 
what we admire or feel contempt for that shows what our ideals are, and as long as we have 
such responses, we have ideals, even if we have no explicit belief or conception of them. 
I want to begin examining admiration more closely by looking at its commonalities 
with pride. First, I’ll set aside their non-agential forms, which have nothing to do with the 
person’s activity. Clearly, I could be non-agentially proud of my thick hair or long legs, if I 
had such. In taking pride in such things, I take them to reflect myself – to show that I meet 
some aesthetic ideal I endorse. Something similar is true of admiring someone’s brown eyes 
or smooth skin – though it seems to me that in this case, our attitude might not be person-
directed at all, in that we might not take meeting the aesthetic ideal to redound to the subject’s 
credit. That is, I can admire your features without admiring you, like I can admire the shiny 
fur of a capybara without admiring the capybara itself.  
Non-agential admiration or awe is a kind of ‘wow-response’, to borrow Sophie-
Grace Chappell’s term (this volume), but it isn’t admiration in the sense that interests me. The 
reason we use the same term is probably the phenomenal similarity in the feelings aroused by 
exemplary people, on the one hand, and objects or characteristics that are in some way 
excellent tokens of a type, on the other. But beyond the feeling aspect, non-agential 
admiration differs from agential admiration both in its intentional and motivational content, 
which strongly suggests it’s really a distinct attitude. When it comes to intentional or 
representational content, non-agential admiration involves no attribution of responsibility to 
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the target. It may be perfectly fitting to admire a beautiful sunset or a butterfly in this sense. 
And in terms of motivation, it involves no tendency to emulate the target, nor other 
motivations characteristic of admiring agents. Its function might be primarily social – after 
all, what it does motivate us to do is often to invite others to attend to its target as well 
(“Check out that sunset/riff/math genius!”). Insofar as attitudes are centrally individuated by 
their intentional and motivational content as well as phenomenal feel, there are thus good 
grounds for thinking that the awe-like response toward non-agential objects or features is a 
different emotion from admiration proper. This is to be expected from a functionalist 
perspective: after all, as I’ve already suggested, admiration proper has a distinctive function 
of identifying those who give concrete shape to our ideals and guiding us towards realizing 
them. 
 My focus, then, is on agential forms of admiration and pride. As I’ve suggested, their 
target is a person, who is construed as leading a life manifesting (or approximating) an ideal 
of the person we endorse. The intentional content of admiration and pride is thus Janus-faced: 
on one side, there’s a pattern of excellent performances, on the other, something excellent 
about the agent that is made manifest by the performances, in virtue of which they are 
attributable to the agent (so that she is in a sense responsible for them)1. I think both are 
necessary. It’s not sufficient that someone possesses a virtue to a high degree, for example – 
in that respect, talk of ideals of the person might be somewhat misleading. As Hume 
observed, bad luck, such as being stuck in “a dungeon or desert”, might prevent a virtuous 
person from ever exercising their virtue (Hume 1975, 584). We may still esteem or approve of 
such a person, but they’re not an object of great admiration but rather something like pity. If 
you’re inclined to think otherwise, consider whether you’d admire Nelson Mandela as much, 
had he never been released from Robben Island, which might of course have happened. 
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 At the same time, merely doing something excellent doesn’t as such merit admiration 
or pride. This is clearest when someone accidentally or unintentionally accomplishes 
something. Imagine that Donald Trump places a call to what he takes to be a Japanese 
businessman with the intention of getting him to invest in a chain of casinos, and ends up 
bragging about his popularity and intelligence. Unbeknownst to him, however, he is in fact 
talking to Kim Jong-un, who consequently has an epiphany: just like Trump, he has deluded 
himself about how his people feel about him, and decides to step down and dismantle the 
North Korean dictatorship. This would no doubt be a great accomplishment for Trump, but it 
would not be to his credit (though he would probably take credit for it).  
Similarly, it possible to do something great intentionally but for the wrong reasons. 
This is obvious in moral cases, but not limited to them. Imagine it turns out that Bruce 
Springsteen felt no compassion for people of colour facing deadly official prejudice when he 
wrote and performed ‘American Skin (41 Shots)’, his moving take on the shooting of 
unarmed immigrant Amadou Diallo by New York City police, but instead put on a calculated 
display to manipulate emotionally vulnerable audience in the hopes of amassing even more 
money than he already has. Since a crucial part of what makes his actual performance 
praiseworthy is that it gives audible form to a deep concern and compassion in a way that 
enables listeners to empathize with mistreated members of society, there is little to admire in 
the hypothetical alternative. 
Let me try to be a little more precise. Here’s my first thesis: Admiration construes its 
target as leading a life characterized by praiseworthy achievements that are to a significant 
degree explained by their meeting a worthwhile ideal of the person – for short, as realizing a 
worthwhile ideal – and doing so to a notably higher degree than the norm or oneself. 
Consequently, it is fitting when the target indeed leads such a life in virtue of realizing the 
ideal to such an extent. We might also say it is justified when the evidence available to the 
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subject warrants thinking that the target has done the things and has the features she is 
construed as having, and that the ideal in question is worthwhile – even if the evidence 
happens to be misleading, so that admiration is not in fact fitting.  
I’ll return to the implications of this thesis in what follows, but I’ll first explicate it a 
bit. I’ve argued in the past that for something to be a praiseworthy achievement, it must be a 
competent performance that meets or exceeds a contextually relevant, authoritative, and 
challenging standard without excessive opportunity cost (Kauppinen 2017a). A standard is 
authoritative in the relevant sense when it derives from a system of rules, practice, or aim that 
promotes, honours, or realizes a sufficient amount of some genuine value. Moral standards 
are an obvious example of authoritative standards, but there are many different kinds of value 
that can be realized by a variety of different practices with internal standards, such as sports 
or even participation in a market economy. Consequently, many kinds of performance, such 
as executing a perfect pirouette, improving a microchip, or clinching a trade deal, can be 
praiseworthy, even if they don’t directly promote or realize value. I emphasize, however, that 
exhortative attitudes are appropriate on holistic grounds. While we might take an individual 
achievement to be indicative of realizing an ideal (as well as partly constitutive of it), 
admiration is rightly reduced by subsequent failures. (I’ll return to this soon.) 
At the same time, as I’ve just argued, it is not enough that a performance is 
praiseworthy. To warrant an attitude toward the agent herself, the performance must be 
explained by something deep about the agent – by their meeting or approximating a 
worthwhile ideal of the person in virtue of having the right commitments and character traits.2 
Typically, having such characteristics goes hand in hand with realizing them in action. 
Consider a non-moral ideal, being a good scholar. If you ask me, it involves something like 
coming to understand some complex subject matter(s) ever more deeply, and conveying one’s 
insights to others in talks, writings, and teaching. It takes more than, say, intelligence and 
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systematic knowledge to be a good scholar – you also need to do things like write and teach. 
It is an ideal I endorse, and have chosen to try to realize in my own life, unlike many other 
ideals I also endorse. I admire people like Nussbaum or Parfit, who seem to me to live up to 
such an ideal. Indeed, as exemplars, they shape the ideal: they show how the relevant values 
can be promoted or realized. Conversely, I’m still ashamed of a couple of bad talks I’ve given 
in high profile conferences, because they are not only evidence of but partly constitutive of 
my conspicuous failure to live up to the scholarly ideal. 
Next, I acknowledged that admiration construes its target in comparative terms, as 
realizing the relevant ideal to a higher degree than oneself or at least the norm. As Simon 
Robertson points out (this volume), there is a Nietzschean case to be made against admiration 
on the grounds that it involves a kind of self-abasement relative to the target. However, I 
think it does make good sense to admire someone for conspicuously exceeding the norm with 
respect to an ideal, even if one takes pride in doing so oneself as well – why couldn’t Bob 
Dylan admire Robert Johnson without false modesty? And when someone else really is 
superior to me with respect to a genuine virtue, looking up to them isn’t servile, but an honest 
acknowledgment of having work left to do.  
 Let’s suppose, then, that the positive exhortative attitudes of pride and admiration 
present their target as at least approximately realizing an ideal in their lives to an unusually 
high degree. Insofar as the motivational aspect of an attitude makes sense in light of its 
intentional content, we’d expect similarities on that side as well. And indeed they can be 
found. Roughly speaking, pride motivates us to keep doing what we’re doing even if it’s hard 
(Williams and DeSteno 2008) – to keep living in a way that approaches an ideal we endorse. 
Admiration, it is often said, motivates us to emulate the person we admire – that is, to try to 
start living in a way that approaches the ideal they realize in their lives. This is related to its 
comparative nature, the sense of looking up to the target that it involves, or at least regarding 
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them as better than most. This action tendency is presumably why the emotion evolved in the 
first place: there are benefits to be had by identifying successful people and doing the sort of 
things they do. Nonetheless, this claim about motivation must be qualified. I don’t have to 
adopt every ideal of a person that I endorse as my own. I admire Zinedine Zidane, but this 
doesn’t motivate me to execute clever breakthrough passes in the midfield. But watching him 
does inspire me to try to do better at my own chosen métier, and to recommend aspiring 
footballers to emulate him. (I don’t think this exhausts admiration’s motivational impact; I’ll 
come back to this later.)  
I do think that some kind of motivational aspect pertaining to realizing ideals we 
endorse is essential to admiration as an attitude. This may be obscured by the fact that we can 
often say that we admire someone without feeling any motivation (or indeed having any 
introspectively discernible feeling). But that’s because such talk can express not only an 
attitude, but also a judgment to the effect that the target approximates some ideal, or that 
admiration is warranted. The difference between thinking that someone is admirable and 
occurrently admiring them comes out most clearly in the motivational aspect.  
 
2. Ideals, Focus, and Fit 
I’ve given an initial sketch of how thoughts about ideals and exemplars enter into the content 
of admiration. But matters turn out to be somewhat complicated. Looking more carefully at 
how our evaluative attitudes are focused reveals that among commonalities, there are 
important differences between pride and admiration, and that it is somewhat puzzling why 
admiration is fitting toward the kind of imperfect creatures we all are. 
 Let me first try to distinguish between two aspects of the intentionality of an attitude, 
target and focus. The target, as I’ve already said, is the object that the attitude is directed 
towards, such as a person or a chair or an idea. Focus, in contrast, is the feature of the target 
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that it has to have for the attitude to be fitting. I emphasize that having the focus isn’t 
sufficient for fit, since there may be and typically are other conditions, such as those relating 
to what the target does. For example, anger construes an action as a violation of a normative 
expectation, and an agent (the target of anger) as the author of the action. We can say its focus 
is authorship of the action – for short, I’ll say it’s act-focused – but for it to be fitting, 
authorship doesn’t suffice, since the action must also violate a legitimate normative 
expectation. Importantly, focus can be seen in the way in which the attitude moves us to relate 
to the target. An attitude that focuses on someone merely as the author of a particular act 
leaves other modes of relating to the person intact, or nearly so. But not all attitudes are like 
that, as we’ll soon see. 
When it comes to focus, the basic distinction that matters for my purposes is between 
what I will call act-focused and person-focused attitudes. I’ll say that an attitude is act-
focused when it is directed towards oneself or another as the author of a particular action, and 
person-focused when it is directed towards oneself or another as the bearer of an enduring 
constellation of traits and attitudes (as the kind of person one is). Person-focused attitudes 
may be and often are based on particular choices, but in that case the choice is taken to reveal 
something deep and lasting about who the agent is. Between these two there’s also a third 
class of what we might call trait-focused attitudes, which are akin to person-focused attitudes 
in that they target a lasting feature of the person, but it is not taken to reflect something about 
the person as a whole. 
 Here’s a tentative classification of some evaluative attitudes in terms of this 
distinction: 
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Act-focused Trait-focused Person-focused 
Guilt Localized shame? Shame 
Anger, indignation   
  Love  
  Contempt 
Authentic pride Hubristic pride Hubristic pride 
  Admiration 
 
Guilt is the paradigm act-focused attitude.3 If I treated you harshly because, as I finally 
realize, I was trying to prop up my own fragile ego, I may feel guilty for what I did. It is the 
particular choice I’m responsible for that I wish I could unmake, and for which I feel like I 
must make amends. Guilt thus involves thoughts regarding a specific action and motivates 
attempts at reparation and acting otherwise in the future. Anger and indignation are second-
personal parallels. Shame, as many psychologists emphasize, is quite different. Famously, we 
need not take ourselves to be responsible for something to be ashamed of it. But even when 
we’re ashamed of something we did, it is because we see it as deeply implicating who we are. 
We are defective, unfit to enjoy the regard of others. As June Tangney and Jessica Tracy 
(2013) put it, it involves feeling small and exposed and unworthy. Acute shame permeates our 
self-relation – we don’t just feel bad about a particular thing we did, but regard everything 
about ourselves in a negative light. So it is natural that shame motivates us to hide ourselves 
or hide what we did by denying it, and often shifting the blame to others to escape the burden 
of self-hatred.    
 Love and contempt further illustrate the distinctions in focus. They are 
characteristically person-focused. While we do sometimes say things like “I love your sense 
of humour” or “I feel contempt for your weakness”, I think these sentences either express 
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some sort of evaluation rather than attitude (I might have said “You have a great sense of 
humour”), or are used to indicate the grounds of our attitudes toward the person as a whole (I 
might have said “The reason I have contempt for you is your weakness”). These attitudes, too, 
permeate the way we relate to their target, which makes them hard to fit together, given their 
contrasting polarity. While anger is quite easily compatible with love – after all, it may even 
reflect our high expectations towards someone we care about (see Kauppinen 2017b) – 
contempt isn’t, because it is hard to find someone wonderful and worth cherishing at the same 
time as regarding them falling far short of being the kind of person they should be, and being 
motivated to avoid their company as far as possible. (It is no surprise that Gottman and 
Levenson (2000) found contempt to be the best predictor of divorce.) 
For my purposes, the most important issue concerns the bottom two lines of the 
table. The salient difference here is that there’s a choice-focused form of pride, which I’ve 
labeled ‘authentic pride’, in accordance with terminology in use in psychology. In contrast, 
admiration, I’m claiming, is never choice-focused, but always targets the person. The second 
difference that I’ll come to soon is that while hubristic pride is ethically problematic, person-
focused admiration is not. 
 I adopt the distinction between authentic and hubristic pride from recent 
psychological literature. Jessica Tracy and Richard Robins characterize the distinction as 
follows: in the case of authentic pride, we “attribute […] success to internal, unstable, and 
controllable causes”, while in the case of hubristic pride we “attribute success to internal, 
stable, and uncontrollable causes” (Tracy and Robins 2007, 522). What they mean is that 
when I’m authentically proud of something, I think that my praiseworthy achievement results 
from a specific effort or choice that I made that I might not have made, and that was up to me 
to make. Authentic pride is thus the counterpart of guilt, which similarly focuses on specific 
choices that were up to me. Hubristic pride, in contrast, involves thinking that I’m successful 
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because of something inherent in me, a talent or trait that is superior to that of others, which is 
not up to me in the same way. 
 The labels ‘authentic’ and ‘hubristic’ might well be thought to be tendentious. The 
rationale for them is that findings suggest they have different consequences for individuals. 
Studies by Jessica Tracy and her co-authors suggest that authentic pride motivates further 
effort to repeat a status-enhancing success that one doesn’t take for granted, and is linked with 
personality traits such as agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, and self-
esteem. Hubristic pride, in contrast, promotes seeking social status by domination, 
intimidation, and manipulation – if you think you’re special, it’s no surprise if you demand 
special treatment. Crudely, the difference between authentic and hubristic pride is the 
difference between thinking “What I did is great” and thinking “I’m so great”. The former 
construes the self thinly, as the responsible author of an act who might well do something 
different the next time in the absence of renewed effort, while the latter construes the self 
thickly, as the bearer of enduring traits and talents that are responsible for one’s achievement. 
It is plausibly ethically problematic to regard oneself in the latter way – even if it’s true that 
one has met some ideal in virtue of talent or an enduring trait. I’ve suggested in earlier work 
(Kauppinen 2017a) that such thoughts involve something akin to Sartrean bad faith, namely 
thinking of oneself as existing in the manner of a thing, when in fact the existence of our traits 
and exercise of our talents requires ever renewed choice. When it comes to virtue, we can’t 
rest on our laurels, since no virtue guides or constrains our future choices without our 
continued active involvement. 
 
3. Fittingness and Appropriateness of Admiration 
Assuming that pride indeed has two facets and that admiration is its third-personal sister 
attitude, we’re left with two important questions. If pride can be act-focused, why not 
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admiration? And why isn’t person-focused admiration ethically problematic, if hubristic pride 
is? Let’s start with the first one. I think there’s a number of reasons to think that agential 
admiration must be person-focused, rather than act- or trait-focused. (We can of course have a 
kind of wow-response towards actions like juggling seven burning swords, but as I’ve argued, 
that’s a different attitude.) This is one respect in which my view differs from Linda 
Zagzebski’s (2017) well-known account, since she holds that admiration is directed toward 
particular traits, whether native talents or acquired excellences.  
The first reason to think admiration is person-focused is that any bad behaviour, or 
more generally falling conspicuously short of any important ideal we endorse, is properly a 
strike against admiring someone. When it came out that the comedian Louis CK had sexually 
harassed a number of female colleagues by exposing himself to them, it didn’t make him any 
less funny, but it did appropriately reduce the admiration that many had felt for him. Further, 
isolated acts simply don’t make admiration fitting – though we may of course say that we 
admire someone on account of a tough choice, when we take it to reflect commitments or 
character traits apt to lead to a life of praiseworthy achievement. Focus on the person also 
explains the common phenomenon that the more we know of a hero of ours, the less we 
admire them: we come to realize that even if they do approximate one ideal, they fall short 
along many other dimensions (for example, any number of successful men turn out to have 
been inveterate womanizers). The second, and related, reason is that admiration’s effects on 
interaction with its target are pervasive, like the effects of love or shame. They’re not limited 
to motivation to emulate the target in ways that are related to their perceived excellence. It’s 
not unusual for us to start dressing like our heroes, for example, even if it’s not sartorial 
elegance that grounds our admiration. But admiration also involves a disposition to pay 
attention to and find out more about its target, to recommend her as a model to others and to 
 15 
defend her against criticisms, to feel happy when the target is successful or gets recognized 
and sad when they suffer a loss or die, and so on.  
There are several further reasons, too. Two of them have to do with relationships to 
other exhortative attitudes. Consider the possibility of self-admiration. If such a thing exists, it 
is virtually indistinguishable from hubristic pride. If what I say is right, they have basically 
the same intentional content – both portray me as living up to an ideal I endorse in virtue of 
my enduring features. Insofar as admiration motivates emulation, self-admiration motivates 
me to be like myself – or just glory in my magnificent self. And that’s just hubristic pride. 
And since hubristic pride is uncontroversially person-focused, admiration must be the same, 
or the two wouldn’t coincide in the case of self-admiration. The fourth argument is similar, 
except it begins with the observation that the contrary of admiration is contempt or disdain, 
which is also widely considered a person-focused attitude (Bell 2013). The difference 
between contempt and admiration is polarity, not difference in focus. Act-focused attitudes 
like resentment and anger do not have admiration as their contrary, but rather gratitude or 
contentment.  
Finally, fitting admiration seems to have a higher bar than fitting pride. You might 
legitimately be proud of getting the kids to school in time when your spouse is away. 
Nevertheless, don’t expect me to admire you for it. What explains this difference? Well, if 
admiration focuses on the person, it’s harder to merit it, because you’ll need to have a set of 
traits and lasting commitments that explains a pattern of praiseworthy performances. You 
could easily get the kids to school without such a psychology. (You’ll also have to be superior 
to me, but that’s probably true when it comes to this kind of case.) Since authentic pride, in 
contrast, is act-focused, in can be appropriate on the basis of a single act. 
 Some of these arguments point to admiration being focused on enduring features. 
I’ve already given reasons why such focus is holistic, but some might still insist that we can 
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admire character traits. But I think this is misleading. I may admire your tenacity. But I’m not 
sure if it makes sense to admire tenacity as such – it’s not really the character trait, even a 
virtuous one, that is the object of the admiration. (Nor do I envy wealth as such, but your 
wealth.) And in admiring your tenacity, it seems that I’m admiring you. That’s why I don’t 
admire Margaret Thatcher’s tenacity, though I grant that it was a virtue of hers. On the other 
hand, I confess I admire Lyndon Johnson’s ruthlessness in twisting Southern senators’ arms 
to ram through civil rights legislation, even though I don’t think ruthlessness as such is a good 
thing. It’s really Johnson I admire. Finally, it may be that a trait, such as acerbic wit, is both 
grounds for admiring and grounds for not admiring someone (assuming it hurts people, for 
example). 
 Given the difference between first- and third-person perspectives, person-directed 
admiration isn’t ethically problematic for the same reasons as hubristic pride is, though they 
seem to be in many ways parallel attitudes. While hubristic pride is smug and in bad faith, 
admiration isn’t. For me, your traits and abilities exist in a different way than they do for you 
– they’re independent of the choices I make or am going to make. For me, they are facts 
about you, while for Sartrean reasons my own traits aren’t simply facts about me for myself. I 
can predict you’re going to keep doing good things, but I can’t simply predict that of myself, 
since the truth of the prediction is in my own hands, or rather in the hands of my future self, 
who is free to decide otherwise. Unlike hubris, admiring you doesn’t encourage complacency, 
but self-improvement or keeping it up. We may have good reason to do our best to resemble 
an exemplar. 
But that is not to say person-focused admiration doesn’t raise ethical questions. 
Indeed, it gives rise to what I’ll call the Puzzle of Admiring the Imperfect: everybody falls 
short of some legitimate ideal of the person, so how can it be fitting to admire anyone? For 
example, I just said I admire Lyndon Johnson. At the same time, I know that he was a 
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philandering bully and sycophant, who got his country into the Vietnam war in large part for 
reasons of domestic political expediency. How could he be admirable? But who is, then? 
Even saints have their flaws, as Susan Wolf (1982) famously pointed out. Will it turn out that 
admiration is after all never, or at best very rarely, a warranted attitude? I don’t think so. I’ll 
next consider two possible solutions to this puzzle. 
 The first way to try to avoid the puzzle is to distinguish between different kinds of 
admiration. It seems natural to say that someone like Picasso is aesthetically admirable, even 
if he’s not morally admirable. One way to make sense of this is to say that it is fitting for us to 
adopt one kind of attitude, one of aesthetic admiration, towards him, but not moral 
admiration, which is a distinct kind of attitude. This would go at least some of the way 
towards solving the puzzle. I’m not happy with this proposal, however. It doesn’t seem to me 
that there’s a variety of attitudes of admiration. To be sure, there’s some case for the notion 
that there are feelings of elevation that are distinctive of admiring those who are morally 
impressive. This is one reason why some psychologists, such as Algoe and Haidt (2009) 
distinguish moral elevation from other forms of admiration. We might nevertheless insist that 
as long as intentional and motivational content are the same, we don’t really have a different 
attitude or emotion. Of course, the ideals and consequently grounds for admiration are 
different, but that doesn’t make for a different attitude, any more than different normative 
expectations alone give rise to different forms of anger.  
 The second issue is that there seem to be too many different ways to be admirable for 
this strategy to be plausible. Even if we can distinguish between a couple of different species 
of admiration, it won’t help explain why Lionel Messi is admirable as a footballer but not 
admirable as a taxpayer – even if there is an attitude of moral admiration, there isn’t going to 
be an attitude of football admiration and taxpayer admiration. 
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 So how, then, can we make sense of admiring the imperfect? I think we can make the 
case that admiration can be fitting in many different ways. Rather than a plurality of attitudes, 
there is a plurality of kinds of fit. Among other things, this solution has the benefit of 
generality: there are plenty of other attitudes that can be fitting in different ways (Kauppinen 
2015). After all, it seems like someone can be, say, aesthetically as well as morally 
contemptible. 
 In the case of admiration and related attitudes, there is a straightforward way of 
explaining why there would be different kinds of fit: there are, after all, different kinds of 
ideal that a person might realize in their lives. Roughly, to be morally admirable, one must 
live up to a moral ideal, and to be aesthetically admirable, one must live up to an aesthetic 
ideal. But this is only the beginning, since our ideals can be quite fine-grained. This goes 
especially for ideals that derive from standards of excellence that are internal to our various 
practices. I mentioned the ideal of a scholar above. But there’s also the ideal, or possibly 
many ideals, of a teacher, or a politician, or a doctor, or a father. All of these are possible 
ways of leading a life that can realize or promote something of genuine value, so that the 
standards they involve are authoritative. When somebody does approximate realizing such 
ideals in their lives in virtue of their enduring traits or commitments, they can be admirable in 
a specific way. Lyndon Johnson, for example, is politically admirable, or admirable from a 
political point of view, given his ability to find solutions that would persuade people with 
very different viewpoints.  
 This account has a number of interesting implications. First, according to it, there’s 
no such thing as being admirable tout court, unless that means being admirable from every 
applicable perspective. It may be that no one is admirable in that way. But that’s not a big 
deal, since it is still fitting to admire many people. Second, it is possible that it’s fitting to 
admire someone from one point of view and disdain them from another point of view. 
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Consider Erwin Rommel. He’s generally recognized as one of the greatest German generals 
of World War II, an inspiring leader of men who achieved feats many had considered 
impossible. At the same time, though he wasn’t personally a Nazi and even supported the 
conspiracy against Hitler, he fought for one of the worst causes in history. So while from a 
military perspective, he merits admiration, from a moral perspective we must condemn and 
even disdain him.  
Now, it follows from what I’ve said that you can’t, as a matter of fact, adopt both of 
these attitudes towards the same target at the same time. Both are person-focused, and 
permeate interactions with the target in ways that are polar opposites. So how should we 
relate to Rommel, or Picasso, or Messi, then? Let me first emphasize that this is a distinct 
question from whether someone is admirable in some way (that is, whether admiration is 
fitting). To make this distinction clear, consider fear. Sometimes you shouldn’t be afraid, 
because the target of your emotion isn’t in fact dangerous (say, it’s a spider). But if you’re 
caught in the midst of a hurricane, say, fear might well be warranted. At the same time, it 
might paralyze you and result in great harm. This is a strong reason for you to want not to be 
afraid, and to do what you can to down-regulate your warranted response. I’m not sure if it 
makes sense to say you shouldn’t feel afraid in such a situation, since it is an involuntary 
response, but you should try to get rid of it. Similarly, the question of whether it is fitting to 
admire Rommel from a military perspective is distinct from whether we should admire him. It 
seems natural to me to say that although he’s militarily admirable, we have reason to want not 
to admire him, and perhaps, insofar as admiration is under direct voluntary control, that we 
shouldn’t admire him, given that he fought for a terrible cause.  
So, in short, it doesn’t follow from that fact that it’s in some way fitting to admire 
someone that we should admire her, just as it doesn’t follow from something’s being valuable 
that we should value it in the sense that implies emotional investment. Perhaps the simplest 
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thing to say is that admiring can be appropriate, all things considered, when the target is 
admirable in some way and is not disadmirable or contemptible from the moral perspective. 
Morality, after all, has a unique function and authority in demanding or prohibiting certain 
attitudes, laying claim to a universal jurisdiction in a way that other perspectives don’t.4 No 
one thinks we shouldn’t, all things considered, admire a scientific genius just because her 
personal hygiene leaves much to be desired. Alternatively, we might say that appropriateness 
of admiration is subject-relative – maybe it depends on which ideals are particularly important 
to you whether rating low enough by their standards disqualifies someone as an object of 
appropriate admiration for you, regardless of their achievements on other dimensions. 
Whether we should admire someone who is in some way admirable may further 
depend on our own projects and life history. For example, it makes good sense for me to 
admire Nussbaum, since we’re both engaged in the scholarly project, and she does it so much 
better than I do, while it is less sensible for me to invest in admiring someone who is good at 
woodworking, since such pursuits aren’t a priority for me now. 
 
Conclusion 
To sum up, I’ve defended the following three theses regarding agential admiration in this 
paper: 
1. Admiration construes its target as (approximately) realizing a worthwhile ideal of the 
person to a greater degree than the admirer (or the norm). 
2. Admiration is always person-focused rather than act- or trait-focused. 
3. Admiration is fitting from a specific point of view as long as the agent 
(approximately) realizes the relevant worthwhile ideal of the person, even if they fall 
short of other ideals. Whether admiration is all things considered appropriate depends 
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also on the relevance of the ideal they approximate to our own projects and on the 
target’s not falling conspicuously short of moral (or subjectively important) ideals. 
 
I suspect that what I’ve said is controversial in particular when it comes to emphasizing the 
realization of excellent traits in action rather than merely possessing them, highlighting the 
holistic focus of the attitude, and noting the consequent restrictions on its appropriateness. But 
I believe we have good reasons to accept these theses, given the function of exhortative 
attitudes in general in guiding our personal development and the way agential admiration 
permeates our relationship to our idols.5 
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1 For this sort of responsibility, see Watson 1996 on attributability. 
2 Compare with Shoemaker 2015 on the grounds of attribution-responsibility. 
3 Although, as Simon Robertson reminded me, there are other alleged forms of guilt, such as survivor guilt, 
which are controversial precisely because they don’t relate to one’s own acts. 
4 It follows from this that my admiration of LBJ is all-things-considered inappropriate, insofar as he did morally 
terrible things (as well as morally admirable ones). Mea culpa. 
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Munich Admiration workshop in September 2017. 
